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604 Michigan Law Review 
Collateral Estoppel: Loosening the Mutuality Rule 
in Tax Litigation 
[Vol, 78:604 
Collateral estoppel is an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata1 
that precludes relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. A judg-
ment in a prior action may be held conclusive as to issues in a subse-
quent case. even though the later case technically involves a different 
cause of action.2 The rule of collateral estoppel seeks to conserve 
I. The term "res judicata" covers the general law of the finality and effect of prior 
judgments as influencing subsequent litigation, REsrATEMENT oF JUDGMENTS, Introduc-
tory Note § 41 (1942) [hereinafter RFSl"ATEMENT]. Other doctrines under its general 
heading include merger. bar. and direct estoppel. Merger and bar preclude parties 
from relitigating the same cause of action. If a judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff, his cause of action is merged in the judgment and he cannot thereafter bring an-
other suit on the same cause of action. REsrATEMENT, supra. §§ 45(a), 47. E.g., Dearden 
v. Hey, 804 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1989). If a judgment is rendered on the merits 
against the plaintiff, the original cause of action is barred. RFSl"ATEMENT, supra, §§ 45 
(b), 48, E.g., Thompson v. Washington Natl, Bank, 68 Wash. 42, 122 P. 606 (1912), 
Direct estoppel precludes the plaintiff from litigating the same issue that was litigated 
in a prior action. For example, if an action is dismissed for the nonjoinder of a third 
person as defendant and the plaintiff brings another action on the same cause of ac-
tion, again without joining the third person, the necessity of joinder may not be re-
litigated. Where a judgment for the defendant is not based on the merits, however, 
the plaintiff is not barred from maintaining a subsequent action, REsrATEMENT, supra, 
§§ 45(d), 49. 
2, REsrATEMENT, supra note I. § 68(1). Collateral estoppel may apply to questions 
of law as well as fact, provided that both causes of action arise out of the same subject 
matter or transaction. RFSl"ATEMENT, supra, § 70. E.g., Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 
289 U.S. 620, 626 (1988): United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 286, 241-42 (1924). 
January 1975] Notes 605 
judicial energy,8 promote confidence in the judicial system,4 avoid 
litigant expense,5 promote community peace and reliance on judg-
ments,6 and minimize inconsistent results.7 Countervailing policy 
concerns are the right of each person to have his day in court,8 the 
fear of increased litigation,9 the danger of perpetuating error,10 the 
need for flexibility,11 and other considerations of fairness.12 Whether 
a court will apply collateral estoppel in a certain case will often be 
determined by a weighing of these conflicting policies.18 
If the facts in the second action parallel those of the first, but arise out of a su&' 
ceeding transaction, collateral estoppel may not apply. REsrATEMENT, supra, § 70, com-
ment e. E.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-601 (1948). 
A change in the law through judicial decision, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 
5, 9 (1937), statute, e.g., Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1951), or 
administrative regulation, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 519, 522 (10th 
Cir. 1949), may also limit the application of collateral estoppel. See text at notes 51-52 
infra. 
3. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); In re Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 
85 (D,C. Cir. 1965); Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 
1953); Warthen v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 798, 800 (1962); Polasky, Collateral Es· 
toppel-Ef/ects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. R.Ev. 217, 219 (1954); von Moschzisker, 
Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929). 
4. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952); Vestal, Rationale of 
Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS u. L.J. 29, 33-34 (1964). 
5. Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1965); Wallingsford v. Larcon Co., 
237 F-2d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 1956); Hyman v. Regenstein, 222 F-2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 
1955); Van Dyke v. Kuhl, 171 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir. 1948); Warthen v. United States, 
157 Ct. Cl. 798, 800 (1962). 
6. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950); Commissioner v. Sun-
nen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); von Moschzisker, supra note 3, at 300. 
7. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 818, 820 (1952) [here-
inafter Developments]. The same general policy concerns pervade all aspects of res 
judicata. See Polasky, supra note 3, at 219; Developments, supra, at 820. Consequently, 
policy discussions that apply to one aspect of res judicata may be relevant for other 
aspects as well. E.g., Developments, supra, at 840 n.161. 
8. The right to a day in court is required under the due process clause. Hansberry 
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 
476 (1918). Courts, however, have discussed the right in general terms without men-
tioning constitutional buttresses. E.g., United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 {3d 
Cir. 1948). 
9. Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 1945); Moore 8c Currier, 
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgements, 35 TUL. L. R.Ev. 301, 309 (1961). 
10. United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 236 (1927); Union Metal Mfg. 
Co., 4 B.T.A. 287, 288-89 (1925). It has been suggested that the problem of error per-
petuation may be greater where complex legal issues are involved. Divine v. Commis-
sioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1974). Contra, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. 
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331-34 (1971); Evans & Robins, De-
mise of Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-
So-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA, L. REv. 179,205 (1971). 
11. Polasky, supra note 3, at 221; Developments, supra note 7, at 820. 
12. E.g., Title v. Immigration 8c Naturalization Serv., 322 F.2d 21, 24 (9th Cir. 1963). 
13. Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971); 
Seven-Up Co. v. Bubble Up Corp., 312 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Spilker v. Han-
kin, 188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 35, 194 
P.2d 1, 8 (1948); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 
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The mutuality rule is a principle that is used to limit the ap· 
plication of collateral estoppel:14 A judgment in a prior suit will 
bar relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent action only where 
both parties to the subsequent action, or their privies,1G are bound 
by the prior judgment.16 Although the mutuality rule is currently 
losing favor, 17 federal courts have continued to apply the rule 
rigidly in tax litigation.18 This note will assume that the policy judg-
ments behind the general movement away from the rule are sound, 
and examine the arguments advanced in support of maintaining the 
mutuality rule in federal tax litigation. It will be suggested that, 
once the trend away from mutuality in other areas is accepted, there 
GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1966). For example, collateral estoppel will be applied only to is• 
sues that actually were litigated and determined in the previous action and that were 
essential, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337-38 (1957); Cromwell v. County of 
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1876); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV, L. 
REv. 1, 10-15 (1942); REsrATEMENT, supra note 1, § 68, comment m. The court in The 
Evergreens v. Neeman, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 720 (1944), 
distinguished between "ultimate" and "mediate" facts; only determinations of ultimate 
facts-"those facts, upon whose combined occurrence raises the duty, or right in ques-
tion"-would be conclusive in subsequent actions. The policy behind this distinction 
is explored in Polasky, supra note 3, at 237-38; Developments, supra note 7, at 843, 
For a catalog and discussion of other principles that may limit the application of 
collateral estoppel, see Developments, supra, at 840-50. 
14. Various attempts to defi~e the mutuality rule are summarized in Annot., 31 
AL.R.3d 1044, 1060 (1970) (footnotes omitted): 
The mutuality rule has been expressed by the courts in varying language, Thus, 
it has been stated that an estoppel by judgment is mutual if both litigants arc 
concluded by the judgment, and that otherwise it binds neither, Expressed in an• 
other form, the estoppel effect of the judgment operates mutually if the person 
taking advantage of the judgment would have been bound by it had it gone the 
other way. It has also been said that the thrust of the mutuality rule is that 
since one not a party to the former action cannot be bound by the judgment 
therein, it necessarily follows that neither can he take advantage of it; that un-
less both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it against the 
other in a subsequent action; and that a party should not be able to plead res 
judicata of an issue unless the other party could have Jlleaded it against him had 
the judgment been the other way. The mutuality rule has also been expressed to 
the effect that nobody can take benefit by a verdict who would not have been 
prejudiced by it had it gone contrary. 
15. For a discussion of the terms "parties" and "privies," see Developments, supra 
note 7, at 855-65. 
16. 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407 (5th ed. E. Tuttle 1925); REsrATEI\IENT, supra 
note I,§ 93. 
17. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313, 327 (1971). See text at notes 26-27 infra, 
18. E.g., Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Charles M. Demuth, 
57 T.C. 225 (1971), affd., 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972); William A. Belcher, Jr., 24 CCH 
TAX CT. MEM. 1 (1965); Elsie Keil Mathisen, 22 T.C. 995 (1954). Other decisions have 
sustained the rule in dictum. E.g., Walter Wilson Flora, 47 T.C. 410, 413 (1967); Ronald 
F. Weiszman, 31 CCH TAX CT. MEM, 1201 (1972), affd., 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir, 1973); 
Matt R. Kane, 30 CCH TAX CT. ME.Ill'. 943 (1971); Estate of Sol Goldenberg, 23 CCH 
TAX CT. MEM, 810 (1964), affd,, 66-1 CCH U.S.T.C. ,J 9297 (9th Cir, 1966). But see 
Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, affd, on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E,D, Pa, 
1972); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 29 CCH TAX CT. ME.Ill'. 318 (1970). 
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are no convincing reasons for retaining the rule in tax cases in-
volving the same tax year. 
The mutuality rule has two components: First, a judgment 
cannot bind a stranger who has not had his day in court; second, 
strangers to a judgment cannot assert that judgment against parties 
to the previous action. The first proposition is required by the due 
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Con-
stitution, which guarantee all aggrieved parties a proper hearing 
in court.19 The second proposition was long assumed to be a corol-
lary of the first-if a person was not bound by a prior adjudication, 
he should not benefit from it:20 
The justification for this requirement has been said to be that a 
party may be unwilling to press his case to the utmost in a partic-
ular suit, and that it would penalize him to enable strangers to 
take advantage of his laxity; that an adversary system requires that 
a party to an action should [normally] risk the loss of rights or the 
creation of liabilities only with reference to his adversaries; or that a 
jury may often reach results inconsistent with the truth, and that 
such a mishap should not affect a losing party outside the partic-
ular litigation.21 
Several courts began to diminish the importance of the second 
requirement by creating a broad exception to its application in 
derivative liability situations.22 The major blow to the doctrine 
came in 1942, when the California Supreme Court, in the landmark 
case of Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Association,23 explicitly rejected rigid mutuality as a strict require-
ment of collateral estoppel: "There is no compelling reason ... for 
requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have 
been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation."24 
19. See note 8 supra. 
20. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining 8: Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); 
Litchfield v. Goodnow's Admr., 123 U.S. 549 (1887); Graves v. Associated Transp., 
Inc., 344 F.2d 894-, 896 (4th Cir. 1965); l A. FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 428. 
The second proposition is not in fact required by due process, since collateral estoppel 
would be applied only against one who did participate in the prior adjudication. See 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 
330 (1971); Note, Impacts of the Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estop-
pel by a Non-Party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1014 n.31 (1967). Rather, the require-
ment has been supported by the "assumed unfairness" of binding one party to the 
prior judgment but not the other. REsrATEMENT, supra note 1, § 96, comment a. 
21. Developments, supra note 7, at 862 (footnotes omitted). 
22, Derivative liability situations include cases in which liability is based on the 
master-servant, principal-agent, or indemnitor-indemnitee relationships. See Note, The 
Requirement of Mutuality in Estoppel by Judgement, 29 !LL. L. REv. 93, 94- (1934-); 
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 104-4-, 1065-66 (1970). 
23. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P .2d 892. 
24. 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 894-. 
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In place of the mutuality rule, the court outlined three requirements 
for the application of collateral estoppel: "Was the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action 
in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the 
party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication?"25 
Since Bernhard, a continued trend "away from the rigid require-
ments of mutuality" has taken place in both the federal26 and state 
courts.27 The mutuality rule has largely been replaced by a par-
ticularized approach to the application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.28 In reviewing the facts of each case, the courts will con-
sider competing policies and determine the equity of precluding 
one party from rearguing an issue that was resolved against that 
party in an earlier litigation.29 For example, courts increasingly 
reject the mutuality rule where a "prior judgment [is] invoked 
defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an 
issue he litigated and lost as a plaintiff in a prior action."80 
The mutuality rule, however, has been retained by most courts 
in tax cases.81 In Rogers v. Commissioner,82 for example, the court 
dealt with the dissolution of the joint venture Range-Liberty. Mrs. 
Rogers, the sole shareholder of Range, had personally cosigned with 
Range the initial venture agreement and had agreed to create an 
escrow security fund. Liberty, in buying out the interest of Range, 
contracted to pay Range and Mrs. Rogers separately. The Com-
missioner argued that the payments to Mrs. Rogers constituted 
25. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P .2d at 895. 
26. 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 92 (Supp. 1973); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1067 
(1970). 
27. Abolition was neither "instantaneous nor universal" in the state courts, but a 
trend away from the rule has become apparent. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. 
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 314, 326 (1971). See also Currie, Civil Pro-
cedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 38 (1965); Annot., 31 A.L,R.3d 1044, 
1067 (1970). 
28. Currie, supra note 27, at 32-33; Polasky, supra note 3, at 222; Note, Collateral 
Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 725, 727-28 (1967), E.g., 
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Glidden 
Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). 
29. "The rule of non-mutuality is not a general one but a limited one to be deter-
mined from the facts and circumstances in each case whether or not it should be ap• 
plied." United States v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (E.D. Wash. 1962), affd,, 
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). See also Blonder-Tongue Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971); Divine v. 
Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048-50 (2d Cir. 1974); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 
944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 
F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). 
30. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313, 324 (1971) (footnote omitted). 
31. See cases cited note 18 supra. 
32. 180 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1950). 
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ordinary income to her as a distribution of proceeds from the sale 
of the assets of Range. The Third Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, 
held that Mrs. Rogers was entitled to capital gains treatment on 
the contract payments; she was a real party in interest, and the 
purchase contract represented a sale of her interest in the venture.83 
The identical transaction was relitigated in the Tax Court and ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit,34 where the corporation, Range, was 
the respondent-taxpayer. The Tax Court refused to be bound by 
the Third Circuit's finding because the parties were not identical,35 
and again held that the contract with Mrs. Rogers represented pay-
ments made to Range and then distributed to Mrs. Rogers. Ac-
cordingly, the corporation was held to have received capital gain on 
the payments to Mrs. Rogers.86 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
Tax Court's refusal to apply res judicata.37 Consequently, both Mrs. 
Rogers and Range recognized capital gain from the Mrs. Rogers-
Liberty contract. If the modem theory of collateral estoppel88 had 
been applied, Range would have been able to bind the Commis-
sioner-the initiating party in Rogers-to the resolution of the 
distribution issue in the Third Circuit. Similar applications of the 
mutuality rule continue to find expression in other tax cases.89 
Such applications may be explained, if not justified, by a mis-
application of precedent. Arguments concerning the appropriate-
ness of collateral estoppel in tax cases have arisen most often in 
litigation involving similar transactions that take place in successive 
years.4° Few cases have considered the application of the mutuality 
rule in other than the successive-year context.41 Similarly, most 
33. 180 F.2d at 723-24. 
34. American Range Lines, Inc., 17 T.C. 764 (1951), afjd., 200 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1952). 
35. 17 T.C. at 771. 
36. 17 T.C. at 771. 
37. 200 F.2d at 845. 
38. See text at note 30 supra. 
39. See cases cited note 18 supra. 
40. See cases mllected in Annot., 130 AL.R. 374, 376-77 (1941). 
The Supreme Court explained the application of collateral estoppel to cases in-
volving succeeding tax periods in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948): 
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin of a new li-
ability and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-liabil-
ity relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res 
judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and the same 
tax year. But if the later proceeding is concerned with a similar or unlike claim 
relating to a different tax year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral estoppel 
only as to those matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented 
and determined in the first suit. 
41. But see Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Baily v. United 
States, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
A closely related question concerns the relationship of the three parties who might 
represent the government in a tax case: (1) the United States, (2) the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, or (3) a local tax collector. The mutuality problem generally was 
resolved by holding that all of these government representatives were in privity with 
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scholarly discussions of collateral estoppel in federal tax litigation 
consider only multiple-period applications.42 Unfortunately, bot~ 
courts and commentators have assumed that because collateral 
estoppel is applied narrowly in the multiple-year context,48 it should 
be applied narrowly with respect to all aspects of federal tax 
litigation.44 
The Supreme Court first confronted the application of collateral 
estoppel to a tax case involving successive tax years in Tait v. 
Western Maryland Railway Co.45 In that case, the Court had to 
determine the amount of amortization allowable on bond discounts. 
The taxpayer had successfully litigated the issue in an action con-
cerning his 1918 and 1919 tax returns, but the government sought 
a new determination with respect to tax years 1920-1925. The gov-
ernment's main argument was that "a judgment in a suit concerning 
income tax for a given year cannot estop either of the parties in a 
later action touching liability for taxes of another year."40 The 
Court responded: "As petitioner says, the scheme of the Revenue 
Acts is an imposition of tax for annual periods, and the exaction for 
one year is distinct from that for any other. But it does not follow 
that Congress in adopting this system meant to deprive the govern-
ment and the taxpayer of relief from redundant litigation .... "·17 
The Court reviewed the facts and the law involved in the two 
each other. Consequently, collateral estoppel could bind each of them as a result of 
initial litigation against one of them. Some decisions, however, held that suit against 
a collector was personal, and therefore privity between the United States and the 
collector did not e.xist. This problem was resolved by the adoption of Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939, § 3772(d) (now INT. R.Ev. CODE oF 1954, § 7422(c)), which provides for 
the application of res judicata in such cases. See Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal 
Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320, 1340-43 (1937); Annot., 130 AL.R. 374, 382-84 (1941). 
Many tax cases have applied collateral estoppel against persons in privity with former 
litigants. See, e.g., Hilton Lumber Co. v. Grissom, 70 F.2d 892 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
293 U.S. 613 (1934); Seaboard Commercial Corp., 28 T.C. 1034 (1957): D. Bruce For-
rester, 4 T.C. 907 (1945). 
42. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 41, at 1327; Heckman, Collateral Estoppel as the 
Answer to Multiple Litigation Problems in Federal Tax Law: Another View of Sunnen 
and The Evergreens, 19 CAsE W. R.Es. L. REv. 230 (1968); Raum, The Sunnen Case and 
Res Judicata in Federal Tax Litigation, 7 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 253 (1949); Note, 
Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases, 35 IowA L. R.Ev. 700 
(1950). 
43. See, e.g., Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 
U.S. 913 (1950); Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. 
denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1946); Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 38 T.C, 733, 744-45 (1962): 
Griswold, supra note 41, at 1357; Note, supra note 42, at 711, 713. 
44. E.g., Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum): Polasky, 
supra note 3, at 235; Raum, supra note 42, at 262. 
45. 289 U.S. 620 (1933). 
46. 289 U.S. at 623. 
47. 289 U.S. at 624. 
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actions, found them identical, and held that the government was 
estopped from relitigating the amortization issue.48 
After Tait, several cases applied collateral estoppel in multiple 
tax-year litigation.40 However, criticism of the Tait decision50 led 
the Court to limit its scope. Blair v. Commissioner51 soon established 
one of the major limitations on collateral estoppel in tax litigation: 
An intervening change in legal climate will render collateral estoppel 
inapplicable in subsequent proceedings.52 The Court further limited 
Tait in Commissioner v. Sunnen.53 The taxpayer argued that an 
earlier proceeding against him before the Board of Tax Appeals 
involving payments under a 1928 contract collaterally estopped the 
48. 289 U.S. at 625-26. 
49. See Wobber Bros. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T .A. 133 (1934); Portage Silica Co. v. 
Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 881 (1934), afjd., 89 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 302 U.S. 
711 (1937); Leininger v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 874 (1934), afjd., 86 F.2d 791 (6th 
Cir. 1937). 
50, E.g., Special Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association, 
61 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 821, 831 (1936): 
As a result of this decision, if the taxpayer secures a decision of a court, even 
though not the Supreme Court, with respect to a particular income tax question 
which recurs in later years, he becomes entitled to the benefit, or subject to the 
burden, of the decision, even though it is later determined in other cases that the 
decision is wrong. This causes a lack of uniformity in the application of the law 
among the taxpayers and this result does not seem to be required by any funda-
mental principle involved in the doctrine of res adjudicata. The year liugated is 
of course closed by the judgment, but there seems to be no reason why the tax-
payer should be treated more or less favorably in a later year than the law as 
finally determined warrants, merely because he had litigation about some previ-
ous year's taxes. This point deserves further study to determine whether or not 
the principle of the Tait v. Western Maryland Railway Company decision as ap-
plied to subsequent years should be changed by legislation. 
See also Griswold, supra note 41, at 1320. 
51. 300 U.S. 5 (1937). 
52. The Court in Tait noted that there had been no changes in the relevant 
revenue acts and treasury regulations between the two cases there at issue, and conse-
quently collateral estoppel could be applied. 289 U.S. at 625-26. Blair involved an in-
tervening state court decision, however, rather than a change in statutory law, and 
thus expanded the concerns expressed in Tait to encompass any change in legal cli-
mate. 300 U.S. at 9. Blair has been relied upon in many subsequent cases. E.g., Corrigan 
v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Arundel-Brooks 
Concrete Corp., 152 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Security-First Natl. 
Bank, 148 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1945); Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63 (1st 
Cir. 1945). 
The rationale for the Blair rule was summarized in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 
U.S. 591, 599 (1948): 
A taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a particular tax matter, a mat-
ter wliich may recur without substantial variation for some years thereafter. But 
a subsequent modification of the significant facts or a change or development in 
the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or errone-
ous, at least for future purposes. If such a determination is then perpetuated 
each succeeding year -as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is 
accorded a tax treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same 
class. As a result, there are inequalities in the administration of the revenue laws, 
discriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and a fertile basis for litigious confu-
sion. 
53. 333 U .s. 591 (1948). 
612 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '111:604 
Commissioner from relitigating the taxable status of later payments 
under that contract and under identical contracts that had been 
separately negotiated.64 The Court could have rejected the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel on the basis of Blair,r;5 but chose instead 
to reconsider the "identical facts" requirement of Tait in deciding 
whether to apply collateral estoppel as to the separate contracts: 
0£ course, where a question of fact essential to the judgment is ac-
tually litigated and determined in the first tax proceeding, the parties 
are bound by that determination in a subsequent proceeding even 
though the cause of action is different. . . • And if the very same 
facts and no others are involved in the second case, a case relating 
to a different tax year, the prior judgment will be conclusive as to 
the same legal issues which appear, assuming no intervening doc-
trinal change. But if the relevant facts in the two cases are separable, 
even though they be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not 
govern the legal issues which recur in the second case. Thus the 
second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identi-
cal with, but in a form separable from, the one dealt with in the 
first proceeding. In that situation, a court is free in the second pro-
ceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at 
issue.56 
Sunnen involved identical parties, and therefore does not bear 
directly on the mutuality rule. However, in dictum apparently 
gleaned from common-law collateral estoppel concepts,07 the Court 
made clear that there would be no estoppel where the parties were 
different.08 
Unfortunately, later decisions have relied upon the Sunnen 
dictum to deny the application of collateral estoppel in cases in-
volving the same tax event and the same tax year.6° For example, in 
Harold S. Divine60 the Tax Court rejected a shareholder's argument 
that collateral estoppel be applied, even though a circuit court had 
previously held in favor of another shareholder of the same cor-
poration on the same tax issue with regard to the same corporate 
transaction.61 The court noted that "(i]n the cases which have come 
before this Court involv¥}g the question of mutuality we have 
voiced adherence to the mutuality principle, following the lead set 
54. 333 U.S. at 596. 
55. 333 U.S. at 600. 
56. 333 U.S. at 601 (footnotes omitted), 
57. 1133 U.S. at 597-98, 
58. 333 U.S. at 597-98. 
59. E.g., Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152, 158 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 500 
F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); William A. Belcher, Jr., 24 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1, 12 (1965). 
60. 59 T.C. 152 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir, 1974), 
61. 59 T.C. at 158. 
January 1975] Notes 613 
by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen ... and Tait v. 
Western Md. Ry. Co . ..• "62 
Relying on Sunnen and Tait to sustain the rigid rule of mutu-
ality in tax litigation has two flaws. First, cases involving successive 
tax years are distinguishable from cases involving the same tax year. 
In Sunnen, the Court justified its strict approach to collateral 
estoppel by pointing to the potential that subsequent changes in 
facts or law would make a present determination obsolete or erro-
neous by the time it was applied in future litigation.il8 But the 
danger that the facts or law will shift over the years is not present 
in cases growing out of the same fact situation and concerning the 
tax liability of similarly situated parties for the same year. Second, 
Sunnen did not provide an explicit rationale for its dictum requiring 
mutuality. The Sunnen Court purported to apply common-law 
concepts,64 but with the deterioration of those concepts in other 
areas,65 the Sunnen mutuality rule must be questioned unless policy 
factors peculiar to tax litigation independently support its retention. 
Although early cases largely ignored the justifications for the 
mutuality rule,66 the recent case of Divine v. Commissioner61 has 
suggested considerations that arguably justify the rule's continued 
vitality in tax cases. The Rapid American Corporation had made a 
cash distribution to its shareholders in 1961, and one of its share-
holders had successfully argued in the Seventh Circuit that the dis-
tribution was a return of capital and not taxable. Divine, arguing in 
a later case for similar treatment ·with respect to the same distribution, 
asserted that the Seventh Circuit opinion bound the Commissioner 
to refrain from taxing the payments. Both the Second Circuit and 
the Tax Court rejected Divine's position, arguing that the use of 
collateral estoppel would hinder the uniform application of the tax 
laws68 and inhibit the clarification of difficult provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code.69 
The Tax Court asserted that invoking collateral estoppel in 
Divine would lead to inconsistent application of the tax law in 
two situations. First, "an unwarranted distinction" between the 
treatment of shareholders of one corporation and that of "identically 
situated shareholders" of other corporations might result, "thereby 
disturbing the uniformity in the application of the tax laws."7° Con-
62. 59 T.C. at 158. 
63. See note 52 supra. 
64. 333 U.S. at 597-98. 
65. See text at notes 26-30 supra. 
66. E.g., Appeal of Charles L. Suhr, 4 B.T .A. 1198 (1926). 
67. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), revg. 59 T.C. 152 (1972). 
68. 500 F.2d at 1048; 59 T.C. at 159-60. 
69. 500 F,2d at 1049-50; 59 T.C. at 159. 
70. 59 T.C. at 160. 
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sistency in results, however, also would support the application of 
collateral estoppel, because estoppel would result in uniform treat-
ment of all of the shareholders of the same corporation. If courts 
are forced to choose between imposing different treatment on share-
holders of one corporation vis-a-vis shareholders of another corpora-
tion and imposing different treatment on shareholders of the same 
corporation, they should find the first alternative less objectionable. 
Dissimilar treatment among shareholders of different corporations 
may often be explained by subtle factual distinctions.71 Such distinc-
tions are less likely among shareholders in the same corporation, at 
least with respect to issues of corporate taxation. 
The Tax Court also argued that applying collateral estoppel on 
the basis of the previous Seventh Circuit opinion72 would "be dis-
rupting to the uniformity in the application of the law within the 
jurisdiction of any circuit court of appeals which might disagree 
with the Seventh Circuit's holding ... , because Rapid's share-
holders throughout the country would benefit from the collateral 
estoppel effects of [the Seventh Circuit's decision] regardless of the 
view taken by their own circuit."73 However, uniformity in the 
application of a national tax law would be optimally achieved only 
if the law is applied with similar effect on a national scale.74 Allow-
ing the value of intra-circuit uniformity to outweigh the uniform 
national application of the tax law seems incongruous, for the federal 
tax law is designed to apply consistently on a national scale. Indeed, 
the application of collateral estoppel would enhance rather than 
hinder the uniform application of the tax law. Under the present 
s~ucture, the taxpayer seeking to contest his ta.x liability may 
choose between refusing to pay his assessed taxes and arguing his 
case in the Tax Court75 and paying his tax and suing for a refund 
in a federal district court76 or in the Court of Claims. 77 Appeals 
71. See, e.g., Charles M. Bernuth, 57 T.C. 225,233 (1971), 
72. The case referred to is Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), 
in which another shareholder of the same corporation had successfully litigated the 
same issue on the same facts against the Commissioner. 
73. 59 T.C. at 159-60. 
74. See Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1955); Estate of Wil• 
liam E. Edmonds, Jr., 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951) (dictum); Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity 
Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES 311, 312 (1956). 
75. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 6213(a). 
76. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 7422; 28 u.s.c. § 1346(a)(l) (1970). 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (1970). 
The system's inequities have often been criticized. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 
1154-63; Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, 
and Gift Taxes-a Criticism and a Proposal, 38 CoLUM. L. R.Ev, 1393, 1406-11 (1938); 
Comment, The Tax Court, the Court of Appeals and Pyramiding Judicial Review, 9 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 827 (1957). 
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from the Tax Court78 and from a district court70 may be taken in 
the appropriate circuit court. & a result, when two circuits differ 
on a particular issue, the outcome of the litigation may depend on 
where the appeal from the Tax Court is taken or on which district 
court initially hears the proceeding. In multiple-shareholder and 
multiple-partner transactions that involve parties located in dif-
ferent circuits, similarly situated litigants could receive different 
tax treatment unless collateral estoppel were applied.so 
A broader application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
would reduce the often-discussed81 anomaly of the Tax Court's 
"Golsen rule." In an effort to promote uniformity by acting as a 
national spokesman, the Tax Court at one time refused to be bound 
by decisions of the various courts of appeals.82 Typically, however, 
the taxpayer would appeal and the interpretation of the reviewing 
court of appeals would prevai1.sa Needless appeals were thus neces-
sitated.s4 In Jack E. Golsens5 the Tax Court finally agreed to. follow 
a decision that was "squarely in point" and was decided by the court 
to which appeal lay.so Although the Golsen doctrine normally will 
result in the elimination of duplicative appeals, it may lead to 
anomalous results when two or more decisions of the Tax Court 
involving the same facts are appealable to two or more courts of 
appeals.s7 For example, two fifty-per cent shareholders of the same 
78. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 7482(a). 
79. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1970). 
80. See, e.g., text at notes 88-92 infra. 
81. See, e.g., Note, Status of a Controversy: The Tax Court, the Courts of Appeals, 
and Judicial Review, 32 Omo S1;. L.J. 164, 167-69 (1971). 
82. E.g., Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 719-20 (1957), afjd., 258 F.2d 562 (9th 
Cir. 1958). 
83. Norvel Jeff McLellan, 51 T.C. 462, 467 (1968) (Simpson, J., concurring). 
84. Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), afjd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of 
Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 722-23 (1957); Note, supra note 
81, at 167. The courts of appeals were highly critical of the Tax Court's disregard of 
their decisions. See 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 51.03, at 7 
{1970). 
85. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), afjd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 
(1971). 
86. 54 T.C. at 757. 
87 •••• [I]t frequently happens that a decision of the Tax Court is appealable 
to two or even more Courts of Appeals. A few examples will illustrate. A corpora-
tion, having stockholders scattered over the United States, makes a distribution to 
all. The Commissioner holds it taxable as a dividend from accumulated earnings. 
The stockholders join in a trial before the Tax Court which decides the issue as 
to all petitioning stockholders, contrary to a decision of Court of Appeals A, 
which reversed a prior Tax Court decision, but perhaps in line with an affirming 
decision of Court of Appeals B .••• If it had rendered a separate different deci-
sion for those stockholders in Circuit A, what amount of accumulated earnings 
would remain for future distribution? 
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corporation went before the Tax Court in companion cases, 
Doehring v. Commissioner88 and Puckett v. Commissioner,80 to 
determine whether the corporation's subchapter S status00 had been 
terminated. In Doehring, appeal was to the Eighth Circuit and the 
government prevailed. In Puckett, appeal was to the Fifth Circuit, 
which had enunciated a different interpretation of the law in a 
previous decision,91 and the taxpayer prevailed under the Golsen 
doctrine. As a result, co-owners of the same corporation took the 
same issue and the same facts to the same forum and received dif-
ferent treatment. Application of collateral estoppel, unfettered by 
the mutuality rule, would minimize the anomaly.92 Although col-
lateral estoppel may have little salutary effect in simultaneous cases 
such as Doehring and Puckett,93 the doctrine could be applied to 
successive cases dealing with similarly situated taxpayers to bind the 
Tax Court and the reviewing circuit in the second proceeding to 
the resolutions reached earlier. The Tax Court still must face the 
Golsen issue-whether to defer to the settled law of the reviewing 
circuit-in the first proceeding, but co-owners of the same corpora-
tion in subsequent suits on the same issue would not receive different 
treatment. 
Another characteristic of tax litigation advanced by the Divine 
court to justify the application of the mutuality rule is the need for 
clarification of the Internal Revenue Code. 94 The court, apparently 
contradicting its own argument on the need for uniformity in apply-
ing the tax law, 95 argued that the application of collateral estoppel 
in tax litigation would reduce the development of circuit court 
conflicts and thus lessen the likelihood of subsequent Supreme Court 
review, which is necessary to clarify the Iani.06 
This argument has several weaknesses. First, although inter-
Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718-19 (1957), afld., 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958). The 
court's hypothetical case closely parallels the facts in Divine. See text at notes 67-69 
supra. 
88. 33 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1035 (1974). 
89. 33 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1038 (1974). 
90. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e)(5). 
91. House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972). 
92. Collateral estoppel will not always apply in such situations, however. For ex• 
ample, if the government wins the first suit, subsequent actions may be brought by 
other shareholders since their right to be heard in court is guaranteed by due process. 
See note 8 supra. 
93. Even in simultaneous suits, however, one party may argue for a rehearing of 
his case on the basis of the resolution of the companion case. Cf, Baily v. United 
States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, afld. on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
94. 500 F.2d at 1049-50; 59 T.C. at 159. 
95. See 500 F.2d at 1048; 59 T.C. at 159-60. 
96. 500 F.2d at 1049-50, 59 T.C. at 159. 
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circuit conflict is a ground for the grant of certiorari,91 it does not 
guarantee review.98 Supreme Court Rule 19 states that review on a 
·writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, and the Court traditionally 
has been reluctant to hear tax cases.99 Refusals of certiorari are 
therefore likely results in cases of inter-circuit conflict, and will 
cause confusion rather than clarification.100 Second, the litigants in 
the conflicting cases may be unwilling to seek review in the Supreme 
Court. The added delay101 and expense may be prohibitive,102 and 
in many cases the contested tax liability may be too small to justify 
the appeal.103 Conflict resolution may therefore be delayed until a 
willing taxpayer ·will support the appeal. Third, the mutuality rule 
restricts the application of collateral estoppel with regard to factual 
as well as legal issues. Allowing district courts and the Tax Court 
to reexamine strictly factual questions will not create conflicts that 
give rise to Supreme Court review and clarification of the tax law; 
only conflicts over legal issues can cause the desired result. Fourth, 
the elimination of the mutuality rule would not eliminate circuit-
97. The most common method of review of courts of appeals decisions is by the 
statutory writ of certiorari. Such review is discretionary. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 106, at 476-77 (1970). Review also may be had in specialized instances 
by appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). Finally, the courts of appeals may certify new or 
difficult questions of law to the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. 1254(3) (1970), although 
this procedure has rarely been used. 9 J. MER.TENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 41 (1970). 
98. 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 39 n.95; Comment, Denial of Certiorari 
Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 465, 472 (1963). 
In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), the Court denied cer-
tiorari despite an apparent conflict with a previous Supreme Court decision. Justice 
Frankfurter's opinion discussed the denial of certiorari: 
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same peti-
tion different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result •••• Nar-
rowly technical reasons may lead to denials •••• A decision may satisfy all these 
technical requirements and yet may commend itself for review to fewer than four 
members of the Court. Pertinent considerations of judicial policy here come into 
play. A case may raise an important question but the record may be cloudy. It 
may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illuminated by the 
lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening. 
338 U.S. at 917-18. 
99. 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 38 n.94; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: 
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. R.Ev. 753, 786-87 n.145 (1944). 
100. See Traynor &: Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, 
Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 336, 350 (1940). 
IOI. See R. MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943). 
102. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 1156. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971), where the court discussed 
the same problem with respect to patent litigation: "[P]rospective defendants will often 
decide that paying royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the 
costly burden of challenging the patent." 
103. "Various considerations, other than the actual merits, may govern a party in 
bringing fonvard grounds of recovery or defense in one action, which may not exist 
in another action upon a different demand, such as the smallness of the amount or 
the value of the property in controversy, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evi-
dence, the expense of litigation, and his own situation at the time." Cromwell v. 
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1876). 
618 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:604 
court conflicts. The circuit courts would continue to disagree on 
interpretations of various provisions of the tax code. They would 
be bound by each others' decisions only in so far as those decisions 
concerned similarly situated taxpayers disputing the incidents of the 
same tax event in the same tax year as the case before them. Thus, 
while clarification of the tax law is an important policy considera-
tion, the continued vitality of the mutuality rule is of questionable 
significance in achieving that goal. 
Finally, it might be argued that to employ collateral estoppel in 
tax litigation without applying the mutuality rule would limit the 
ability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to collect the national 
revenue. A Director in one jurisdiction could be bound by litigation 
instituted and completed (and perhaps mishandled) by a Director 
in another jurisdiction.104 As a result, the second Director's attempts 
at settlement, as well as subsequent litigation, may be significantly 
influenced by a circuit court's treatment of a similarly situated tax-
payer in another jurisdiction.105 In large corporate transactions, for 
example, an early loss to one shareholder would bind the Commis-
sioner in all of his dealings with other shareholders. Flexibility, 
however, should be required only when IRS Directors confront 
different factual circumstances. The IRS has a duty of consistency 
toward identically situated taxpayers,100 and that duty should not be 
ignored simply to allow the IRS to have more than one chance to 
win important cases. 
In sum, the application of the mutuality rule in tax cases cannot 
be explained by policy considerations unique to ta.'C litigation. 
Absent such considerations, the general policy factors that have re-
sulted in the abolition of the mutuality rule in most nontax cases 
apply with equal force to federal tax litigation. The need for judicial 
104. There are seven Internal Revenue Regions in the United States, each con-
taining several Internal Revenue Districts. While regional commissioners are rcspon• 
sible for policy and program execution, the District Director's office is the one with 
which the taxpayer usually deals. For further discussion of the organization of the 
Internal Revenue Service, see B. Bl'lTKER &: L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsrATE AND 
GIFr TAXATION 910 (1972). 
105. Cf. Hearings on Treasury-Post Office Dept. Appropriations for 1957 Before the 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 463 (1957), reprinted 
in 8 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. ,f 5876.017, at 66,205-10 (1975) (statement by the 
chief counsel of the Internal Revenue Service arguing against binding the Service to 
court of appeals decisions). 
106 .••• [T]he Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly situated 
taxpayers; he cannot properly concede capital gains treatment in one case and, 
without adequate explanation, dispute it in another having seemingly identical 
facts which is pending at the same time. • • • That the Commissioner's seeming 
inconsistency may have arisen from the right hand's ignorance of the posture of 
the left is little solace to taxpayers who are entitled to a non-discriminatory ad-
ministration of the tax laws by him, much less to a taxpayer ••• who is disad-
vantaged by the discrimination in its case. 
Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1973). See also 
Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 237 (5th Cir, 1958). 
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economy should never outweigh the availability of access to the 
courts to resolve legal conflicts,107 but when the Commissioner has 
one full and fair opportunity to press hi~ claim, and loses, the im-
portance of conserving judicial time assumes great weight in subse-
quent cases raising the same issue.108 Forcing taxpayers to relitigate 
leads to a "significant waste of time, expenses, anq. manpower."109 
Furthermore, inconsistent treatment of identically situated tax-
payers reflects adversely on the stability and rationality of the tax 
system.110 
The general trend toward reviewing the facts of each particular 
case, weighing competing policies, and determining the equity of 
·applying collateral estoppel111 should be extended to federal ta.x 
litigation. However, the Second Circuit and the Tax Court, as 
recently as 1974, have sustained the mutuality rule in federal tax 
cases,112 and the rule has been rejected only by the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania in Baily v. United States.113 On its initial hearing, 
the Pennsylvania court stated: "Since the plaintiff has had a 'full 
and fair opportunity to try the factual issue' presently before this 
Court, we conclude that no significant harm would result by the 
invocation of collateral estoppel, absent mutuality."114 The govern-
ment moved to amend the judgment on rehearing, on the basis of 
the Tax Court's decision in Divine,115 but the Pennsylvania court 
refused to follow the Divine guidance. Although the Baily court 
is alone in its viewpoint, its approach of considering the fairness 
of applying collateral estoppel in the context of the facts of the case 
before it110 should be the practice of the future if the policy judg-
ments of Bernhard are accepted.117 
107. The relative importance of judicial economy in this context was expressed in 
Heckman, supra note 42, at 234: "Collateral estoppel should apply to as many issues 
as possible to eliminate repetitive litigation. On the other hand, the doctrine should 
be applied narrowly enough to ensure each party a fair hearing on all issues." 
108. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 
865 (1950). 
109. Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
110. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of lliinois Foundation, 402 
U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 934 (1964). 
111. "In the present state of evolution of the doctrine of collateral estoppel its in-
vocation has seemed to depend on the existence of circumstantial assurances of the 
fairness of applying it in the particular case. It is not approached with the inflexibility 
and the insistence on the dominance of principle that generally characterizes the ap-
plication of the doctrine of res judicata • • •• " Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernand Sirotta Co., 
281 F. Supp. 704, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also text at notes 23-29 supra. 
112. See Divine v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 152 (1972), affd., 500 F.2_d 1041 (2d Cir. 
m~ . 
113. 350 F. Supp. 1205, affd. on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (1973). 
114. 350 F. Supp. at 1209. 
115. See text at notes 59-62 supra. 
ll6. 350 F. Supp. at 1210. 
II7. See text at notes 23-29 supra. 
